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Brexit,	the	four	freedoms	and	the	indivisibility
dogma
The	EU’s	position	in	the	Brexit	negotiations	is	based	on	the	premise	that	the
four	freedoms	of	the	single	market	–	goods,	capital,	services,	and	labour	–
are	indivisible.	Wilhelm	Kohler	and	Gernot	Müller	(University
of	Tübingen)	argue	that	this	indivisibility	claim	has	no	economic
foundations,	and	that	negotiating	on	this	premise	risks	unnecessary	harm.
Reintroducing	trade	barriers	will	inflict	damage	on	both	sides	of	the	Channel.
The	possibility	that	abandoning	indivisibility	may	cause	harm	through	cherry
picking,	or	through	potential	further	exits,	doesn’t	justify	a	hard	Brexit	scenario.
The	Brexit	negotiations	are	not	going	well	and	Brexit	continues	to	be	a	major	source	of	uncertainty	for	the	British
economy.	This	is	to	a	large	extent	because	the	British	side	apparently	lacks	a	coherent	plan	of	what	it	would	like
to	achieve.	Perhaps	this	is	not	too	surprising,	given	the	difficulty	of	reading	the	result	of	the	June	2016
referendum.	However,	there	is	also	a	major	problem	on	the	European	side.	The	negotiations	are	based	on	a
premise	which	is	fundamentally	flawed,	namely	that	the	four	freedoms	of	the	EU’s	single	market	–	freedom	of
goods,	capital,	services,	and	labour	–	are	indivisible.	Representatives	of	the	EU	have	frequently	repeated	the
indivisibility	claim	and	that	there	can	be	no	cherry	picking	among	the	four	freedoms.	Yet	the	indivisibility	claim	has
no	economic	foundations.	It	is,	in	fact,	a	dogma.	Economic	theory	not	only	defies	the	indivisibly	claim,	it	suggests
that	the	four	freedoms	can	be	substitutes.
Why	the	indivisibility	dogma	defies	logic
This	holds	true	in	particular	for	trade	and	migration.	To	see	this,	you	only	need	to	recognise	that	goods	crossing
borders	embody	the	services	of	productive	factors,	such	as	labour.	The	labour	inflow	embodied	in	a	country’s
imports	has	much	the	same	effect	on	wages	as	a	direct	labour	inflow	(immigration),	and	this	holds	analogously	for
the	labour	outflow	embodied	in	a	country’s	exports.	Thus,	trade	amounts	to	a	movement	of	labour	without	any
movement	of	people.	The	more	restricted	migration	between	two	countries,	the	more	important	unrestricted	trade
between	them.	The	indivisibility	dogma	defies	this	logic,	put	forward	as	early	as	1933	by	Bertil	Ohlin.	In	doing	so,
it	is	causing	harm	on	both	sides	of	the	Channel.	As	an	aside,	we	note	that	there	is	a	strong	case	for	tying	the
freedom	of	people	to	membership	of	a	currency	area,	but,	alas,	Britain	never	joined	the	Eurozone.
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Many	people	will	retort	that	the	logic	of	trade	and	migration	as	substitutes	has	limited	empirical	validity.
Empirically,	trade	and	migration	are	often	complements	rather	than	substitutes.	Trade	caused	by	non-Ohlinian
forces	may	create	migration	incentives	rather	than	reducing	them.	The	presence	of	foreign-born	residents	makes
trade	with	foreign	countries	easier	and	less	costly.	And	exports	of	goods	are	often	tied	to	(supporting)	services,
which	may	require	(at	least	temporary)	cross-border	movement	of	people.	Therefore,	by	restricting	migration	the
UK	also	impedes	trade,	thus	hurting	itself	and	the	EU27.	Very	sad,	indeed,	but	hardly	a	reason	to	inflict	further
damage	on	both	sides	by	reintroducing	trade	barriers	through	a	hard	Brexit.
Why	is	the	EU	insisting	on	indivisibility?
This	is	all	well	understood.	Why,	then,	is	the	EU	so	ready	to	do	harm	by	adhering	to	indivisibility	in	the	Brexit
negotiations?	There	are	at	least	two	answers.	The	first	follows	the	simple	logic	of	winners	and	losers.	Given	that
migration	barriers	are	an	unavoidable	consequence	of	the	June	2016	referendum,	would	anybody	be	better	off
under	a	hard	Brexit,	as	implied	by	the	indivisibility	dogma,	than	under	in	a	soft	Brexit	whereby	Britain	and	the	EU
mutually	keep	the	first	two	movements	(goods	and	services),	even	if	the	fourth	(labour)	is	lost?	The	answer,	of
course,	is	yes.	Just	as	any	trade	liberalisation	has	winners	and	losers,	so	will	the	opposite	scenario	where
barriers	are	reintroduced	for	trade	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.	But	there	is	a	crucial	difference:	while	trade
liberalisation	generates	net	gains	for	the	economies	at	large,	reintroducing	barriers	would	generate	net	losses	on
both	sides	of	the	Channel.	(This	assumes,	realistically,	that	the	EU	will	be	reluctant	to	accept	anything	close	to	a
single	market	for	goods	in	a	special	trade	agreement	with	the	UK,	referring	to	the	indivisibility	of	the	four	freedoms
and	to	the	UK’s	unwillingness	to	accept	free	movement	of	labor;	for	a	discussion	of	possible	arrangements	other
than	maintaining	single	market	status:	see	Thomas	Sampson.
But	why	should	the	(minority)	winners	rather	than	the	(majority)	losers	prevail	from	a	hard	Brexit?	It	is	often
argued	that	trade	liberalisation	is	hard	to	achieve	since	winners	are	a	more	dispersed	lot	with	relatively	little
weight	in	governments’	objective	functions,	relative	to	the	concentrated	special	interests	which	might	be	hurt	by
liberalisation.	In	the	present	context,	this	same	distributional	asymmetry	between	losers	and	winners	works	in
favour	of	a	hard	Brexit.	Examples	for	winners	are	not	hard	to	come	by.	Think	of	the	regions	hoping	to	benefit	from
(purported	or	factual)	relocation	strategies	of	firms	presently	headquartered	in	London.	Moreover,	while
reintroducing	most-favoured	nation	(MFN)	tariffs	between	the	UK	and	the	EU27	would	make	life	harder	for
German	firms	in	the	UK,	EU	tariffs	on	UK	products	may	be	a	welcome	protection	for	these	same	firms	on	EU27
markets.	(Lest	we	are	misunderstood,	we	don’t	claim	to	see	active	lobbying	of	these	interests	in	Brussels.	But
one	is	left	wondering	why	the	voice	of	German	industry	(BDI)	should	come	forward	explicitly	backing	the
Commission’s	strategy	based	on	the	indivisibility	dogma,	while	at	the	same	time	stressing	that	a	hard	Brexit
would	cause	havoc	in	UK-German	trade.)
The	second	explanation	invokes	the	usefulness,	if	not	necessity,	of	policy	rules.	It	argues	that	the	EU	is	all	about
rules,	and	rules	must	be	adhered	to,	no	matter	what.	Generally,	the	usefulness	of	a	policy	rule	cannot	be	judged
only	from	the	outcome	of	adhering	to	it	in	any	one	instance.	Indeed,	accepting	harm	in	applying	a	rule	is	a
powerful	way	to	make	it	credible.	If	it	is	a	good	rule,	then	it	delivers	a	greater	good	that	compensates	for	the
damage	done	in	any	one	instance	of	application.	Yet,	even	if	the	greater	good	as	such	is	established	and
unquestioned,	surely	the	policymaker’s	determination	to	adhere	to	the	rule	should	also	depend	on	the	specific
circumstances	given	at	the	time.
But	what,	exactly,	is	the	greater	good	delivered	by	indivisibility	of	the	single	market	freedoms?	Certainly,	the	static
view	of	gains	from	trade	and	migration	that	we	have	alluded	to	above	fails	in	identifying	such	a	greater	good.
Might	a	dynamic	view	of	the	process	of	gainful	integration	be	more	successful?	Perhaps	in	analogy	to	the
argument	for	preferential	(discriminatory)	trade	liberalisation	as	a	stepping	stone	towards	free	trade,	which	might
be	more	difficult	or	impossible	to	achieve	going	the	multilateral	route?	We	do	not	want	to	rule	out	that	a	rationale
for	indivisibility	can	be	found	along	such	lines,	but	we	do	not	see	it	anywhere	in	the	arguments	put	forward	in
favour	of	indivisibility	since	Brexit	came	up	as	a	real	issue.	Barring	any	such	rationale,	indivisibility	does	not
qualify	as	a	rule,	but	it	is	–	well	–	a	dogma.	Ask	the	Vatican	for	further	details.
Some	qualifications
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We	should	like	to	add	two	qualifications.	First,	questioning	the	indivisibility	dogma	does	not	imply	opening	up
European	integration	to	cherry	picking.	An	orderly	Brexit	that	saves	free	trade	in	goods	and	services	(inasmuch
as	these	do	not	require	presence	of	the	service	provider,	i.e.	modes	1	and	2	of	the	GATS)	is	a	far	cry	from
formally	establishing	an	EU	featuring	integration	à	la	carte.	Surely,	a	soft	Brexit	does	not	imply	that	the	EU	must
offer	its	present	or	future	members	a	menu	of	freedoms	to	choose	from.	Membership	could	still	be	defined	as
adhering	to	all	four	freedoms.
But	wouldn’t	some	countries	want	to	follow	Britain’s	example	if	soft	exits	are	permitted?	Suppose	that	a	soft	Brexit
does	lead	to	further	exit	activity,	fuelled	by	frustration	about	the	freedom	of	labour.	Then,	there	are	two	options	(at
least	as	far	as	countries	which	haven’t	joined	the	Eurozone	are	concerned):	compromising	on	this	freedom,	or
accepting	exits	and	a	smaller	union.	Both	are	regrettable,	but	the	latter	should	not	be	all	that	shocking.	After	all,
there	is	Article	50	of	the	Treaty,	which	is	regrettably	unspecific	when	it	comes	to	the	details.	The	indivisibility
dogma	offers	a	temptingly	simple	way	out:	we	only	need	to	make	exit	a	sufficiently	horrifying	scenario	for	even
the	least	enthusiastic	member	to	be	deterred.	But	this	strategy	itself	is	horrifying.	Harmonious	and	consensual
integration	requires	that	we	seek	an	adjustment	margin	other	than	the	fear	of	the	exit	aftermath.	Sometimes,
retreat	is	the	only	way	to	avoid	defeat.
And	second,	questioning	the	indivisibility	dogma	does	not	imply	that	the	freedom	of	labour	is	of	secondary
importance	and	may	be	discarded	at	no	cost.	The	theory	of	migration	tells	us	that	a	country	may	expect
significant	gains	from	immigration	if	it	can	cope	with	its	distributional	effects.	Yet,	all	governments	are	finding	it
hard	to	communicate	these	gains	to	their	voters,	even	those	who	make	a	serious	effort.	The	UK	is	unique	only	in
that	this	common	problem	has	–	by	accident	more	than	by	intent	–	led	to	it	breaking	away	from	the	EU.
Negotiators	on	both	sides	are	now	forced	to	wade	into	unpleasant	and	unchartered	territory.	In	this	situation,
having	a	euphonious	principle	to	adhere	to	is	all	too	enticing	–	at	least	for	a	while	until	one	realises	that	it’s	a
flawed	dogma.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at
VoxEU.org,	where	more	detailed	references	can	be	found.
Wilhelm	Kohler	is	Professor	of	International	Economics	and	Scientific	Director	of	the	Institute	for	Applied
Economic	Research,	University	of	Tübingen.
Gernot	Müller	is	Professor	of	Economics	at	the	University	of	Tübingen	and	CEPR	Research	Fellow.
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